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Résumé:  Cet article propose d'associer la certification d'origine à une barrière non tarifaire dans les 
échanges internationaux. En effet, la certification d'origine se traduit souvent à la fois par une 
restriction quantitative et par une subvention implicite de la qualité. On considère le modèle 
canonique de concurrence internationale dans lequel une firme domestique et une firme 
étrangère se concurrencent pour la vente de leur produit sur le marché domestique. Dans ce 
cadre, on montre comment l'adoption de la certification peut permettre à la firme domestique 
de se positionner en leader de qualité. Si au contraire elle offre le bien de qualité plus faible, 
le surplus des consommateurs peut être amélioré. 
 
 
Abstract:  This paper put forward the opinion that the certification of origin constitutes another type of 
non-tariff barrier. Indeed, certification of origin often combines both a quantity restriction and 
a sort of quality cost subsidy. We consider the canonical model of strategic trade policy, 
whereby two firms are located respectively in the home country and in a foreign country and 
are competing on the domestic market. In this framework, we show how certification can 
allow the domestic firm to position itself as a high quality producer. If, however, the certified 
firm offers the low quality good, then consumers' surplus may be improved. 
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International trade literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the eﬀects of
various instruments of trade policy and, in particular, to non-tariﬀ barriers (NTB).
Among these NTBs, the most frequently encountered and studied are export subsidies,
import quotas, voluntary export restraints (VERs) and technical barriers to trade.In this
paper, we put forward the opinion that the certiﬁcation of origin constitutes another type
of NTB. Indeed, principally in the agro-food sector, the certiﬁcation of origin systems
are usually based on the respect of production rules, mainly yield restrictions, as well
as the deﬁnition of territorial limits outside of which a producer cannot beneﬁtf r o m
the oﬃcial certiﬁcation1. Taking for granted that the certiﬁcation of origin restrains the
quantities produced and commercialized, it may operate like a VER or an import quota,
in the context of international trade where some countries resort to certiﬁcation of origin
while others do not. However, the certiﬁcation of origin is not a classical VER. First,
unlike with a VER, it is the domestic ﬁrm which is here hurt by the quantity restrictions,
w h e r e a sav o l u n t a r ye x p o r tr e s t r a i n ti saq u o t ao nt r a d ei m p o s e db yt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y
at the request (in general) of the domestic country. Moreover, more often than not (and
particularly in the agro-food sector), a certiﬁcation of origin provides a certain level of
reputation or a guarantee of quality. The certiﬁcation of origin is thus also a kind of cost
1For instance, in the wine-growing sector it is not rare that these certiﬁcations of origin specify, in
addition, a limitation of the production of grapes (as is the case of the French “Appellations d’Origine
Contrôlées” labeling, or more generally the European “Quality Wines Produced in a Determined Re-
gion”). This is also found for cheeses with the deﬁnition of the breed of animal designated to produce the
milk. It is the same for the quality labels in the meat sector which very severely restrict the producers
on the number of animals per hectare that they have and these restrictions are often much more costly
than investments in ﬁxed or variable costs to satisfy production speciﬁcation requirements.
The other pole in the production system and the marketing of the agro-food sector (and especially
for wine) is that which can be observed today in newly exporting countries such as the United States,
Australia, or Chile. Here it concerns a more industrialized form of wine growing based on a simpliﬁed
identiﬁcation of the product variety (for example the type of vine) and on private brands. The often
signiﬁcant promotional investments are essentially associated with these brands (as an example, the
Gallo ﬁrm in the United States has the biggest advertising budget of the entire profession with 30
billion dollars invested each year, see Bastien (1997)).
2subsidy that modiﬁes a ﬁr m ’ sq u a l i t yi n v e s t m e n t sa n di nt u r nt h eq u a n t i t yo ft h ep r o d u c t
oﬀered. Thus, a partial but nonetheless relevant interpretation is that certiﬁcation of
origin may constitute a new type of NTB combining both a quantity restriction and a
sort of quality cost subsidy.
This interpretation is rather original, since in the literature certiﬁcation schemes are
usually regarded as quality labels used by the State as a mean to correct market failures
which are induced by the consumers’ lack of information about a products’ quality. Most
of the theoretical works in this ﬁeld compare the eﬀectiveness of private and/or public
signals with respect to information revelation from the point of view of public economics
(Shapiro (1983)). In contrast, even though we agree that information revelation is an
i m p o r t a n ti s s u e ,o u ra n a l y s i sd o e sn o th i n g eo nt h i sf a c t o r .
Our approach to the problem falls within the framework of the international trade
literature. Our work is related to recent papers on international trade, which largely
focus on the analysis of the eﬀects of quantitative restraints such as import quotas or
voluntary export restraints. More precisely, our model is close to the works of Krishna
(1990), Das and Donnenfeld (1987), Herguera Kujal and Petrakis (2000)2, who analyze
the impact of import quota imposition or voluntary export restrictions on quality choice
in an international competition setting. We consider the canonical model of strategic
trade policy, whereby two ﬁrms are located respectively in the home country and in a
foreign country and are competing on the domestic market.
The main questions we ask in this paper are : under which conditions would the
domestic producer voluntarily choose certiﬁcation ? To what extent will the certiﬁcation
strategy beneﬁt or on the contrary hurt consumers surplus?
We assume that only the domestic ﬁrm can opt for certiﬁcation, since a labeling
organism exists in the home country and not in the foreign country3. The under study
game is thus the following: once the domestic ﬁr mh a st a k e ni t sd e c i s i o na b o u tc e r t i ﬁca-
tion (i.e., whether it is certiﬁed or not), the two rivals ﬁrst choose their qualities and then
2See also Boccard and Wauthy (2000).
3A c c o r d i n gt of o o t n o t e1, this assumption is realistic especially in the wine sector with the competi-
tion between the european system of certiﬁcation and the newly exporting countries (see also Chambolle
and Giraud-Héraud (2003)).
3compete in quantities. In our paper, the certiﬁcation of origin has, through the quantity
restriction, a direct impact on quantities exchanged, and an indirect impact on ﬁrms’
quality choice. Furthermore, the reputation resulting from the certiﬁcation has a direct
impact on products’ qualities. In this framework, we show how certiﬁcation can allow the
domestic ﬁrm to position itself as a high quality producer. If, however, the certiﬁed ﬁrm
oﬀers the low quality good, then consumers’ surplus may be improved, this equilibrium
corresponding to a lower product diﬀerentiation and thus a ﬁercer competition.
The next section presents the general assumptions of our model. In section 2,w ea l s o
develop the benchmark model where the domestic ﬁrm refuses certiﬁcation. We then
identify the conditions for equilibrium under which the domestic ﬁrm chooses to adopt
the certiﬁcation of origin while its rival is not certiﬁed in section 3.T h i si sf o l l o w e db y
section 4, which compares the results in terms of individual proﬁtability for the domestic




Let us consider the canonical model of strategic trade policy, where two ﬁrms are located
respectively in the home country and in a foreign country and are competing on the
domestic market. The ﬁrms oﬀer goods diﬀering in quality on the domestic market of a
normalized size as 1. As we have already mentioned, for historical or cultural reasons,
there exists in the domestic country an institution controlling the certiﬁcation of origin
process from its deﬁnition to its attribution while the foreign country does not have such
an institution. Thus, in our model, only the domestic ﬁrm can adopt the certiﬁcation.
We will relax this assumption in section 6.
If the domestic ﬁrm becomes certiﬁed, it commits itself to limiting its production to
al e v e lz in exchange for the certiﬁcation. In return for the restriction in capacity z to
which it assents, the certiﬁed ﬁrm beneﬁts immediately from a minimal quality level s
(s ≥ 0). This exogenous s parameter reﬂects here the consumer satisfaction with such
4ac e r t i ﬁcation system. If the domestic ﬁrm is not certiﬁed, then it chooses a traditional
brand strategy. A brand ﬁrm is then free to supply all the demand, but has no advantage
for quality at the start. Whatever the chosen strategy be, the ﬁrms can make investments
to improve their quality in relation to their initial quality (respectively, s for a certiﬁed
ﬁrm or 0 for a brand ﬁrm). These investments can represent technical innovation costs
allowing for the objective improvement of the quality of the goods, as well as costs of
brand promotion which contribute to improving the image and the reputation of the
product. In these two examples, the entailed expenses are most often independent from
the quantities produced, we therefore assume that a ﬁrm having adopted the brand













A ss h o w ni nt h eﬁgure 1 below, the amounts invested to reach a given quality level k are












Figure 1: Cost structure with and without certiﬁcation
4Diﬀering from the other form of quality costs, namely variable costs (see for example Motta (1993).
5The two curves (1) and (2) in ﬁgure 1 correspond respectively to the two strategies
which the domestic ﬁrm can adopt. For any quality level k, the brand strategy is
more expensive than the certiﬁcation strategy in terms of investment spendings, the
compensation being that the producer is limited in the quantity put on the market.
The marginal cost of quality improvement is equally less when the ﬁrm is certiﬁed.
This is an important assumption of our model. The main explanation lying behind this
assumption is that there are synergies between both types of investments: the promotion
and reputation of the brand, investments are relatively less costly when combined with
ac e r t i ﬁcation of origin, which constitutes a kind of oﬃcial quality guarantee5.
2.2 Demand
Consumers are distinguished by a taste parameter θ which expresses the intensity of
an individual’s preferences for quality. The one dimensional parameter θ is uniformly
distributed over an interval [0,1]. We assume that each consumer buy zero or one unity
of goods. The surplus Sj (θ) that an individual with the taste parameter θ redeems from
quality kj good’s purchase, is given as: Sj (θ)=θkj−pj,j= l,h. This formulation comes
from Mussa and Rosen (1978) and expresses the surplus of the consumer as the diﬀerence
between a reservation price and the purchase price pj. The relationship between the
reservation price and the quality is linear and depends on the taste parameter θ.T h u s
the quality kj,s o l da tp r i c epj cannot be bought by a type θ consumer except insofar as
Sj (θ) > 0, so that the market is not totally covered by incumbent ﬁrms. Of course, we
assume that consumers know perfectly the quality of the good, this latter being made
up of both intrinsic quality and reputation.
The consumption of each good depends on the qualities oﬀered and on the prices set
on the market. In the same way, when two products of qualities kl and kh,w i t hkl <k h,
prices when quantities ql and qh of each quality good are sold are written:
5Another physical explanation could be that a certiﬁed ﬁrm respecting a capacity constraint will
get a better raw material and thus will reach a better quality of food product through a given level of
research and technological investments.
6¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
pl = kl (1 − qh − ql)
ph = kh − klql − khqh
(3)
Thus, the general expression of proﬁt realized by a quality ki good producer is:
πi = pi (qi,q j6=i)qi − F (ki) where i = l,h (4)
where F (ki) is respectively deﬁned by (2) or (1) according to whether the domestic ﬁrm
is certiﬁed or not.
2.3 The benchmark model
T h ec a s ew h e r et h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm has not adopted the certiﬁcation system, namely the
free trade situation, can be represented by a two stage game where the ﬁrms ﬁrst realize
their investments in quality and then compete in quantity in the absence of capacity
constraints. The equilibrium qualities, quantities and proﬁts of this game were obtained
by Motta (1993) a n da r eg i v e ni nT a b l e1.T h ee x p o n e n tb r e m i n d su st h a tw ea r ei nt h e
particular free trade case where both ﬁrms have a “brand” strategy.
Table 1 : Perfect equilibrium of the duopoly
kb
l =0 .09 kb
h =0 .252
qb
l =0 .275 qb
h =0 .451
πb
l =0 .0027 πb
h =0 .0195
The consumers’ surplus and the welfare (sum of the surpluses of consumers and
producers) respectively denoted SCb and Wb are : SCb ' 0.0402,W b ' 0.0624 . At






Furthermore, the quantity of high quality goods produced is greater than the quantity
of goods oﬀered on the low quality segment6.S i n c et h eﬁrms are perfectly symmetrical
6However, if we introduce the variable quality costs, these costs would lead to a lower quantity of
high quality goods, whose production becomes relatively more expensive, being put on the market in
relation to low quality goods. Consequently, the surplus of the consumers is always higher with a ﬁxed
quality cost rather than a variable cost. Indeed, the latter is maximal when all the quantity produced
is placed on the high quality market.
7at the start, two perfect equilibria exist: one for which a ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality good
and one for which the same ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality one. The high quality good
producer’s proﬁt is always higher than that of the low quality good producer but each
ﬁrm has only a probability 1
2 to be the high quality good producer.
3C e r t i ﬁcation
In this section, the domestic ﬁrm is certiﬁed while the other adopts a brand strategy.
We ﬁrst characterize both types of equilibria, where the certiﬁed (domestic) ﬁrm is the
lower (section 3.1) and the higher ( section 3.2) quality good producer. Then we ﬁnd
out the conditions for having each type of equilibrium (section 3.3).
3.1 The domestic ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality good
We denote cb the situation of competition between a certiﬁed (domestic) ﬁrm c oﬀering
the low quality good and a foreign ﬁrm competing with its brand b oﬀering the high
quality good. At the second stage, the objectives for the two ﬁrms diﬀer here since
the certiﬁed ﬁrm must respect the production capacity restriction z in order to beneﬁt
from a certiﬁed quality level s. We assume that the parameter s remains inferior to the













. This condition is enough to insure that the certiﬁed ﬁrm will always be
ex post restricted whether it be of high quality or low quality. The ﬁrms choose their
quantities for each pair of qualities (kl,k h) by maximising their proﬁts πcb
l and πcb
h .T h e
quantities chosen at the equilibrium are:








The qualities are chosen by the ﬁrms to maximize their respective proﬁts. By replac-
ing the equilibrium quantities above and after a few analytical calculations, we deﬁne
7I nf a c t ,a sw ew i l ls h o w ,a ss o o na ss is above
1
4
, results are constant whatever the value of z.
8equilibria of type cb for all of the parameter values (z,s). These perfect equilibria, when
they exist are characterised by the following (5), (6) and (7):






















3 − 2z (1 − 2z)
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(7)






, scb (z,µ) is a strictly increasing function in µ and decreasing in z. Conse-
quently, at a given level of certiﬁcation s, µcb decreases when the capacity restriction
becomes more restrictive (z decreases). In other words, the diﬀerentiation of product
rises when the capacity restriction becomes stricter while keeping the right to an un-
changed level of certiﬁcation s. Indeed, the brand ﬁrm which produces high quality
goods is then prompted to increase its quality whereas the certiﬁed ﬁrm is inﬂuenced
to reduce its quality. This eﬀect of the capacity restriction is somehow a wealth-eﬀect,
since the potential proﬁts of the certiﬁed ﬁrm decrease when z decreases, whereas those
of the competing brand ﬁrm increase8 boosting its investments.
Now considering the level of capacity restriction z as ﬁxed, the domestic producer
is always encouraged to increase its quality whereas its foreign competitor decreases it
when certiﬁcation level s increases; thus the diﬀerentiation of products decreases. In
fact, the more the certiﬁcation level increases the more the domestic ﬁrm can reach a
high quality for a smaller investment. On the other hand, s dissuades the foreign ﬁrm
from investing in quality. This is a paradoxical eﬀect because when s increases, the
certiﬁed ﬁrm increases its quality, with the result that the high quality ﬁrm could, in
order to maintain a suﬃcient product diﬀerentiation, also have incentives to raise its
8These results agree with Herguera et al.(2000), who examined the impact of an import quota on
the quality choices of the two ﬁrms.
9quality level. This result, as we will show in the section 4.2, also results from interesting
strategic eﬀects between ﬁrms.
3.2 The domestic ﬁrm oﬀers the high quality good
We now turn to determining the bc equilibrium for which the domestic ﬁrm oﬀers the
high quality good. The quantity produced by the high quality certiﬁed ﬁrm is limited
by the capacity restriction. The equilibrium quantities are:








We notice that the quantity equilibrium does not depend on the quality levels kl
and kh chosen by the ﬁrms when the high quality is restricted by z. By replacing the
equilibrium quantities above, maximizing the proﬁts leads to the following qualities:







h = s +( 1− z)z
(9)
In this situation, we easily show that with s ﬁxed, when z decreases the product
diﬀerentiation is lowered. More precisely, the quality chosen by the certiﬁed ﬁrm is lower
whereas the quality chosen by the brand ﬁrm increases. Once again these results are
connected to a wealth-eﬀect and agree with those of Herguera and al (2000).F u r t h e r -
more, with a ﬁxed capacity constraint, an increase of the certiﬁcation level s allows the
certiﬁed ﬁrm to improve its quality without involving any change in the quality of its
rival. The diﬀerentiation of the products therefore increases. There again, we would ex-
pect that, facing an increase in the domestic ﬁrm’s quality, the brand foreign competitor
would reduce its investment in quality. This paradoxical eﬀect directly ensues from the
independence between the quantities and the qualities of the chosen equilibrium.
3.3 Conditions for existence of equilibrium
W ea r ea b l et op r o v et h ee x i s t e n c ea n dt oc h a r a c t e r i z ea l lt h ee q u i l i b r i ao ft h eg a m ei n
which the domestic ﬁrm chooses the certiﬁcation namely to determine the condition for
10having a cb and a bc type equilibria. In order to prove the existence of these equilibria,
it is necessary to verify that one of the two ﬁrms doesn’t have any interest in deviating
by leapfrogging in qualities9. Contrary to the cases studied in the preceding section,
the two equilibria no longer always appear simultaneously. Hence, for certain parameter
values, only one perfect equilibrium exists, whereas, for the intermediary values of z and
s, the two equilibria co-exist. The following proposition reviews the situation on these
results:





¤2, there exist two functions f(z) and g(z) both decreasing in z with f(z) >g (z)
a n ds u c ht h a t :
*w h e ns>f(z), the bc equilibrium is the only sub-game perfect equilibrium.
*w h e ns<g(z),t h ecb equilibrium is the only sub-game perfect equilibrium.
*w h e ng(z) ≤ s ≤ f (z), both sub-game perfect equilibria cb and bc exist.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2:C o n ﬁguration of cb and bc equilibria
9By ”leapfrogging” we mean that one producer choosing its quality so as to maximize its proﬁto f
“the lower” (resp.higher) quality producer may have an interest in investing in a higher (resp. lower)
quality level than its rival.
11In the above ﬁgure, when s>f(z), the only equilibrium which emerges is the one
where the domestic ﬁrm produces the high quality good. Indeed, assume we are in an
equilibrium situation where the domestic ﬁrm oﬀers the low quality good, and let us
considere that s becomes higher than f (z):the quality granted to the certiﬁcation
system s is high enough compared to a less compelling capacity restriction, so that it
becomes too expensive for the foreign ﬁrm to oﬀer the highest quality. It is then in its
interest to leapfrog with low quality, that is, to oﬀer an inferior quality than that of its
competitor. Inversely, assume we are in an equilibrium situation where the domestic ﬁrm
oﬀers the high quality good, when s becomes inferior to g(z), the capacity restriction
the domestic ﬁrm has to respect is relatively strong in relation to the level of quality
s guaranteed by the certiﬁcation system, so that the foreign ﬁrm has an incentive to
produce a higher quality than the certiﬁed ﬁrm.
As mentioned in section 2.3, standard duopoly models of vertical diﬀerentiation ex-
hibit two perfect equilibria in pure strategies. We showed here that the choice of an
appropriate certiﬁcation system (z,s) can lead to select a single perfect equilibrium.
Nonetheless, being the producer of the high quality good is not a guarantee for obtain-
ing the best proﬁt. The reason why being the high quality producer is not a guarantee
for making the best proﬁt is that a capacity restriction z less than 1
4 is much more restric-
tive for a high quality ﬁrm which, in the absence of a capacity restriction, would oﬀer
a greater quantity of the good, than for a low quality ﬁrm. Therefore, the choice of a
particular certiﬁcation system (z,s) can also insure the best proﬁt for the domestic ﬁrm
but not necessarily in implementing the bc type equilibrium. However, an unappropriate
choice (z,s) may also impede the domestic ﬁrm to realize a better proﬁtt h a nt h a to fi t s
competitor, or to position itself as the high quality producer while it would be proﬁtable.
4 Comparative statics: certiﬁcation vs. free trade
We now compare the proﬁts granted to the domestic ﬁrm in case it certiﬁes with those
of free trade. We ﬁrst determine the conditions under which the domestic ﬁrm chooses
the certiﬁcation. In the following sub-section we point out the inﬂuence of the domestic
ﬁrm certiﬁcation on consumers’ surplus.
124.1 Certiﬁcation and proﬁts
Even if a certiﬁcation system exists, the request for certiﬁcation is here a matter of a
private decision on the part of the producer. We are looking for conditions based on the
(z,s) parameters under which adherence to a certiﬁcation system would be proﬁtable for
the domestic ﬁrm given that its foreign rival has a brand strategy.
Proposition 2: There exist a function φ(z) such that, when s>Ma x[φ(z),f(z)],
the domestic ﬁrm adopts certiﬁcation and thus always oﬀers the high quality good. There
exist a function ϕ(z) such that, when ϕ(z) <s<f(z), the domestic ﬁrm adopts certiﬁ-
cation and thus may be the high or the low quality producer (each with a 1
2 probability).
When s<Ma x[φ(z),f(z)] or s<Mi n[f(z),ϕ(z)] then, the domestic producer prefers
a brand strategy.
As represented in ﬁgure 3, we can distinguish three types of answers depending on
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Figure 3: Domestic ﬁrm’s certiﬁcation strategy
The three regions A, B and C are delimited by functions ϕ(z) and φ(z).I n z o n e
A,t h ec e r t i ﬁcation system is too unfavorable and thus the domestic ﬁrm never ﬁnds it
13proﬁtable to certify. Indeed, if s is too low the domestic ﬁrm will never agree to respect
a capacity restriction associated with certiﬁcation. On the contrary, in area C,t h e
domestic ﬁrm adopts certiﬁcation. In this case, choosing a brand strategy, the domestic
ﬁrm could be the high or the low quality producer (each with a probability 1
2) whereas
choosing the certiﬁcation, the domestic ﬁrm is sure to be the high quality good producer.
This eﬀect reinforces the proﬁtability of the certiﬁcation strategy. However, in region B,
the domestic ﬁrm once again ﬁnds the certiﬁcation strategy proﬁtable while he may be
the low quality producer at equilibrium with a probability 1
2. It thus appears that an
equilibrium where the domestic ﬁrm chooses the certiﬁcation strategy and oﬀers the low
quality product may arise.
4.2 Certiﬁcation and consumers’ surplus
We now study the inﬂuence of the domestic ﬁrm certiﬁcation on consumers’ surplus.
Larger quantities and better qualities of course beneﬁt the consumers. We obtain the
following proposition:
Proposition 3: When the domestic ﬁrm chooses certiﬁcation and oﬀers the high
quality good ( s ≥ g(z)), the consumers’ surplus is always weakened in comparison with
the free trade level. On the other hand, when the domestic ﬁrm chooses the certiﬁcation
and oﬀers the low quality good (s ≤ f(z)), there exists a function r(z) ≤ f(z) such that,
if r(z) ≤ s ≤ f(z), the consumers’ surplus increases in comparison with the free trade
level.
The consumers’ surplus reaches its maximum when the entire quantity is allocated
on the high quality market. Finally, when the quantity allocated on the high quality
good market is restricted by the certiﬁcation system, the capacity restriction is relatively
more prejudicial to consumers than when it restricts the quantity allocated on the low
quality good market. This negative eﬀect related to quantities always prevails even over
an improvement of the quality induced by certiﬁcation.
Let us now analyze the diﬀerent eﬀects that may explain the second part of the
proposition. There are both quality and quantity eﬀects. First, the quantity of low
quality good is reduced and on the contrary, the quantity of high quality good increases.
14As we mentionned, at a given total quantity, this new allocation of quantities beneﬁts to
the consumer’s surplus. Nevertheless, the capacity restriction leads to a global drop in
total quantities of products sold on the market which hurts the consumer surplus. When
the domestic ﬁrm chooses certiﬁcation and oﬀers the low quality good, the domestic ﬁrm
beneﬁts from the certiﬁcation system and thus has a higher incentive to invest in quality.
Thus the quality level of the low quality good is higher thanks to certiﬁcation. On the
contrary, because the domestic ﬁrm is constrained in quantity, the foreign ﬁrm has a
smaller incentive to invest in quality since the capacity provokes a rigidity in terms of
the loss of demand incured in case of a lessening of quality10.T h u st h eq u a l i t yl e v e lo ft h e
high quality good decreases thanks to certiﬁcation. Finally, when r(z) ≤ s ≤ f(z), the
product diﬀerentiation is small and the positive eﬀect due to the increase in the quality
level of the low quality product prevails over the damaging eﬀects of both the capacity
restriction and the lowering in quality of the high quality product. The consumers’
surplus is therefore improved. This result according to which the consumers’ surplus
may be higher than in free trade, when the domestic ﬁrm chooses the certiﬁcation and
oﬀers the low quality good was unexpected.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has proposed a formalization of the certiﬁcation as a non-tariﬀ barrier. In our
model, we have assumed that the certiﬁcation system is exogenous from the producer’s
point of view, and we have analyzed its implications in terms of proﬁt for the domestic
ﬁrm that adopts it as well as its implication with products’ quality and consumers sur-
plus. We have shown how a certiﬁcation system based on a quantitative restriction and
initially designed in order to promote the quality of products and to protect consumers,
may be a weapon in international trade when the rival country uses a traditional brand
strategy. In particular, we show how the adoption of certiﬁcation may be used by a do-
mestic ﬁrm to select the equilibrium simply for individual proﬁt improvement prospects
which may be in contradiction with its initial objectives of products’ quality upgrading.
10Indeed, when the foreign ﬁrm’s quality lessens, the consumers who would like to turn to the low
quality good cannot do so because the quantity oﬀered is restricted.
15In reality, it appears throughout the model that the only way to improve the consumers’
surplus is to promote an equilibrium which is not too restrictive on the quantitative level
such that the certiﬁed ﬁrm positions itself on the low quality segment. This equilibrium
corresponds paradoxically to a situation where the products are slightly diﬀerentiated
(the high quality good has a worse quality, and the low quality good a better quality) in
relation to that which would prevail at free trade.
Concerning extensions, we beleive that similar results could also be obtained when
ﬁrms compete in price. In particular, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) showed in a Bertrand
competition model, that imposing a quota on a foreign ﬁrm could allow the domestic
ﬁrm to select the equilibrium and become a leader in quality. More interesting, we have
approached a new game where at the ﬁrst stage both the domestic and the foreign ﬁrms
could choose to adopt the certiﬁcation. The analysis was led assuming that in the two
countries the certiﬁcation system (z,s) were identical. Nonetheless, we couldn’t provide
a whole analytical solution giving the equilibrium conﬁguration of that game. However,
we were able to prove11 that there exists some certiﬁcations systems (z,s),s u c ht h a t
the only equilibrium of the game is asymetric: one producer chooses the certiﬁcation
while its rival chooses a brand strategy. This result comforts us in the opinion that the
situation analysed in this paper may be endogenized.
11See the last part of the appendix.
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176 Appendix
Characterisation of cb equilibrium
F i r s tw ed e m o n s t r a t et h a tscb(z,µ) deﬁne by (7) is encreasing in µ and decreasing
in z.W e h a v e
∂scb (z,µ)
∂µ













∂µ > 0 whatever µ ∈ [0,1]. In the same way,
∂scb(z,µ)
∂z = z (4 − 4µ − µ3)−1 which is strictly descreasing in µ.
∂scb(z,0)










Second, we demonstrate that s = scb(z,µ) deﬁnes a unique µ ∈ [0,1] for all given
(z,s). In order to simplify this technical analysis, we can take a dual problem giving the
value of s for given values of (z,µ) ∈ [0,
1
4




scb(z,0) < 0 and 0 <s cb(z,1) <
1
4
. Hence, since scb(z,µ) is encreasing in µ ,there always
exists a unique b µ(z) ∈]0,1[ such that for all µ ∈ [b µ(z),1], there exists a unique s such
that s = scb(z,µ).
This argument demonstrates that for all z ∈ [0,
1
4
] and for all s ∈ [0,s cb(z,1)],there










], there exists a unique
µ such that s = scb(z,µ).
Equilibrium proﬁts



































Existence of cb equilibrium
For the cb equilibrium, there is leapfrog from the brand ﬁrm if and only if there exists
k0 <k cb
l such that π
leap
h (k0) > πcb
h where π
leap
h (k0) is the equilibrium proﬁt in the subgame
quantity competition.
To deﬁne the leapfrog proﬁt π
leap
h (k0) we need to ﬁnd the leapfrog quantity q
leap
h
and the optimal quality k0 = k
leap
h of leapfrog. Since the brand ﬁrm becomes the lower

















32 .N o w ,l e tC1(z,µ) be such that:
18C1(z,µ)=( 1− z)4 − (1 − µz)2 (1 + µz)(1− 3µz)




h ) > πcb
h if and only if C1(z,µcb) > 0.
C1(z,µ) is a function deﬁned and continuous over ]0, 1
4[×]0,1[ and is diﬀerentiable with
respect to µ. Moreover, we have
∂C1(z,µ)
∂µ =4 z(1 − zµ)(1− 3z2µ2).S i n c e z2µ2 < 1
3 (
z<1
4 and µ<1), we have
∂C1(z,µ)
∂µ > 0. Thus, for all z0 ∈]0, 1
4[,C 1(z0,µ) increases in µ.
We also have C1(z0,0) = (1 − z0)4 − 1 < 0 and C1(z0,1) = 4z0(1 − z0)2 > 0. Hence, for
all z0 ∈]0, 1
4[, there exists a unique µ0 ∈]0,1[ such that C1(z0,µ 0)=0 .G i v e nt h ei m p l i c i t
function theorem, there exists a function µ(z) deﬁne in the neighbourhood of (z0,µ 0)








∂z = −4(1−z)3 +4µ(1−zµ)(1−3z2µ2). We can easily prove
that ψ(z,µ) increases as z and µ increase. Therefore we have ψ(z,µ(z)) < 0 and then
µ0(z) > 0 for all z.T h u s ,µ(z) increases as z increases.
Therefore, we have π
leap
h > πcb
h if and only if µcb >µ (z). Since µcb is such that
s = scb (z,µ),a n dscb(z,µ) increases in µ, we have π
leap
h > πcb
h if and only if s>f (z)
with f (z)=scb (z,µ(z)). We have the following derivative of f with respect to z:
f0(z)=1
4[−2+8 z − 8zµ(z) − 2zµ3(z)+( 1− 4z2 − 3z2µ2(z))µ0(z)] < 0
Moreover, with the arguments given above with the implicit theorem, we have 0 <
f(z) <s cb (z,1) (since µ0 = µ(z0) is such that 0 <µ 0 < 1).
Consider now the leapfrog from the certiﬁed ﬁrm. This kind of leapfrog could emerge
if and only if there exists k1 >k cb
h such that π
leap
l (k1) > πcb
l where π
leap
l (k1) is the




(with µ = µcb). Then we have the following leapfrog proﬁt for the certiﬁed ﬁrm:
π
leap
l (k1)=z(1 − z)(k1 −
kcb
h




l = s+z(1−z) deﬁnes the potential optimal quality of leafrog (according
to the ﬁrst order condition of maximisation of π
leap






l )=z(1 − z)[s + 1
2z(1 − z) − 1
8(1 − z2µ2)]
Let C2(z,µ) be such that:
C2(z,µ)=( 1+3 µ2 + µ4)z2 − (4 + 4µ − µ2 + µ3)z2 +( 2− µ2)z − (1 − µ)




l ) > πcm
l is equivalent
to C2(z,µcb) > 0.
Now, we can demonstrate that C1(z,µcb) > 0 implies C2(z,µcb) > 0 for all z ∈]0, 1
4[.
First, we can verify that C1(z,µ) and C2(z,µ) decrease in µ over ]0,1[.F o ra l lz ∈]0, 1
4[,
we have C1(z,0) < 0 and C1(z,1) > 0.T h u s ,f o ra l lz ∈]0, 1
4[ there exists µ1 ∈]0,1[ such
that C1(z,µ) > 0 if and only if µ>µ 1. On the other hand, for all z ∈]0, 1
4[ we have





w .14.T h u s ,
for all z ≥ z0 we have C2(z,µ) ≤ 0 and for all z<z 0,t h e r ee x i s t sµ2 ∈]0,1[ such that
C2(z,µ) > 0 if and only if µ>µ 2. In this case, one can verify µ2 >µ 1 and the result
given above is demonstrate.
Existence of bc equilibrium




l (k1) > πbc
l where π
leap
l (k1) is the equilibrium proﬁt in the subgame quantity
competition (given kbc
h for the law quality and k1 for the high quality one).




and we have p1 =
1
2










> 0 if and only if Γ(A,k1)=k2
1(1−4k1)−A2 > 0. For a given value of A, Γ(A,k1)
is maximized for k1 =
1
6






z2 [(1 − z)(1 − 3z) − 4s].T h u s , i f s>
1
4
(1 − z)(1 − 3z) we have
Γ(A,kbc





(1−z)(1−3z)). Thus there is no leapfrog from
the brand ﬁrm. On the other hand, for s =0 ,w eh a v eΓ(A,kbc




h ) > 0
and there is always leapfrog from the brand ﬁrm.
There is leapfrog from the certiﬁed ﬁrm if there exists k0 <k bc











for the high quality and k0 for the law quality). In this subgame quantity






z). Therefore the price of the law quality






z) and the proﬁt π0 = p0q0−
1
2




(1 − z)2[2s + z(1 − 2z)]
2(1 + z)(1 − 3z)










(1 − z)(1 − 3z).S o ,i f s>
1
4
(1 − z)(1 − 3z) t h e r ei sn ol e a p f r o gb o t hf o rb r a n d
quality and certiﬁed quality. Hence g(z) exists and g(z) <
1
4
(1 − z)(1 − 3z).M o r e o v e r ,













. Therefore f(z) >g (z).
Certiﬁcation and proﬁts
If the domestic ﬁrm chooses the brand strategy, its expected proﬁti sπbb ' 0.0111.
When s>f(z), the domestic ﬁrm gets a better proﬁtt h r o u g hc e r t i ﬁcation if πbc
h > πbb
if and only if :
s>φ(z)= 0.0111
z(1−z) + 1
8 (5z2 − 6z +1 )
When s<g (z), the domestic ﬁrm never improves its proﬁt through certiﬁcation.
We cannot demonstrate this point in a simple way. Nevertheless, taking into ac-
count that g(z) ≤ 1
4 (1 − 4z +3 z2) and using mathematica one can verify that πcb
l
is a strictly increasing function in s over [0, 1
4 (1 − 4z +3 z2)]. Using (7), and taking
s = 1
4 (1 − 4z +3 z2), we infer the equilibrium value of z∗ (µ) and we maximise πcb
l with
z = z∗ (µ) and s = scb (z,µ).The maximum value of πcb
l is obtained for µ∗ =0 ,7433 and
then we have πcb
l ' 0,0090 < πbb.
When g(z) <s<f(z), the domestic ﬁrm strictly improves its proﬁt through certiﬁ-





h (z,µ)−πbb =0 . Then we verify that ϕ(z) is decreasing in z and that ϕ(0.1) >f(0.1)
while ϕ(0.25) <f (0.25). Thus, there exists (z,s) such that ϕ(z) <s<f (z). We also
check that ϕ(z) >g (z) since g(z) <
1
4
(1 − 4z +3 z2).
Consumers’ surplus




h +2 klqlqh]. Then, for the equilibriums cb and bc,w eh a v e :
SCcb = 1












4 + z3 (1 − z)+sz2
´
Comparing SCcb with SCb ' 0.0402 (Motta (1993)), we ﬁrst deﬁne µ× such that
if µ ≥ µ×,t h e nSCcb ≥ SCb. Since parameters (z,s) have to respect the equilibrium
condition (7), we have µ ≥ µ× (z) if and only if s ≥ r(z) with r(z)=scb (z,µ× (z))
decreasing in z.O n c ea g a i n ,d r a w i n gr(z) show us that when z is high enough, ϕ(z) ≤
r(z) ≤ f(z).
Comparing SCbc with SCb,we easily obtain the following condition: SCbc ≥ SCb if




¤2 we get SCb >S C bc.
Extension
If the two ﬁrms adopt certiﬁcation (we denote this situation cc), they are con-
strained by z. Thus, we infer equilibrium qualities : kcc
l =( 1 − 2z)z + s and
kcc
h =( 1− z)z + s. Equilibrium proﬁts are thus: πcc
l = 1
2z (1 − 2z)(2s + z (1 − 2z)) and
πcc
h = 1
2z (s(2 − 4z)+z − z2 (4 − 5z)). Since there are two equilibrium, the expected






4z (s(4 − 8z)+z (2 − z (8 − 9z))).
Let us now assume that s>f (z). Comparing πbb to πbc
l , we show that, there exists
P1(z) such that if s>P 1(z), the ﬁrm best response when its rival adopts the brand
strategy is the certiﬁcation strategy. Comparing πcc with πbc
l , one can verify also that
there exists P0
1(z) such that if s>P 0
1(z),t h eﬁrm best response when its rival adopts
the certiﬁcation is the certiﬁcation strategy. Thus if P1(z) <s<P 0
1(z), the ﬁrm best
response when its rival is certiﬁed is to adopt a brand strategy (since s<P 0
1(z)) and
the rival’s best response when this ﬁrm chooses a brand strategy is to remain certiﬁed
(since s>P 1(z)). Since when z<0,131, P1(z) <P 0
1(z), there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium where one of the two ﬁrms chooses to certify while the other prefers the
brand strategy.
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